

Forensic **Project management**

Damaged, diseased or murdered?

Telegraph

Inquiry led by Lord Stevens observed that the case was 'far more complex than any of us thought' and this observation is based on 'new forensic evidence'.



May 2006

London Ambulance Service



Purchased a computer system which ultimately was blamed for the deaths of at least 4 people

Deemed as wholly unfit for the task; the system abandoned after 11 days use



No attempt was made to determine whether the **products** to be produced by the project **could in fact give rise to the impacts** (changes to performance and timings) **required** and whether these impacts would give rise to the benefits defined for the project

London Ambulance Service



Purchased a computer system which ultimately was blamed for the deaths of at least 4 people

PIR

Deemed as wholly unfit for the task; the system abandoned after 11 days use

- Supplier with no previous experience in providing dispatch systems rapidly found itself out of depth
- fiasco blamed on:
 - clear evidence of decline in staff & system performance
 - Failures to supervise, test system, and train staff
 - High-risk to switch to a fully automated system without manual backup

NHS Centre for coding and classification

- ⇒ NHS Executive purchased a clinical coding system for £1.25m
- ⇒ Established NHS Centre of Coding and Classification to record and analyse clinical information

1998

- ⇒ £32M spent
- ⇒ 12 hospitals using it
- ⇒ 5 years at least for full implementation

CANCELLED



What went wrong

- ⇒ Objectives set 1992. Criteria for measuring achieving objective not defined till 1994.
- ⇒ No business case –
No investment appraisal
Benefits not assessed
No risk assessment of different options

Analysis OGC's report


“Sound project appraisal must include a rigorous assessment of costs and benefits, and a **realistic assessment of any risks.** These should be contained in a properly structured business case”

Modelling the project

Benefit

Impacts



Products



BIP modelling

Impacts	Success	KPIs	Products
Improvements... Changes in performance & behaviour	What does success look like? What does failure mean?	KPI measures Owner Evidence Profile over time	Outputs
			Deliverables
			Physical things or states

BIP modelling

Impacts	Success	KPIs	Products
<p>Allocation of resources matched to degree of emergency</p>	<p>Public feel confident that every call is responded to with despatch.</p>	<p>Time to response Call centre CTI metrics</p>  <p>Pickup time LAS Ambulance logs</p> 	<p>Call log</p> <p>Time logs</p> <p>Urgency criteria</p> <p>Availability logs</p> <p>A* algorithms</p> <p>Call routing</p>

The Scottish parliament building



Original figure for the construction of the building was £50m

After £470m spent problems still evident.

PIR

- ➔ Sponsor accused of manipulating budget
- ➔ Design accepted that could not be delivered within budget
- ➔ Quality chosen whenever a conflict between quality, cost & time
- ➔ Time chosen whenever conflict between cost & time
- ➔ Governance model muddled
- ➔ Loss of control of the project not capable of being detected by monitoring processes chosen

The Scottish parliament building



Original figure for the construction of the building was £50m

After £470m spent problems still evident



True CSFs never declared in project documentation. What 'good looked like' never made explicit. Project plan not aligned to project mission.

West Midlands health authority – electronic trading system

⇒ Business case costs
£5.3m, offset by royalties
of £3.9m

⇒ 1992 Regional Health
Authority costs £7.3m

Implementation stopped –
costs £10m – no royalties!



What went wrong

- ⇒ No real market research
Suppliers not consulted
Customers not consulted
- ⇒ Supplier 'take up' based on
no evidence
- ⇒ Royalty projections based
on no evidence

Analysis OGC's report

“The project was not viable
because information
contained in the business
plan was **speculative and
unrealistic.**”

Sydney Water



Tender accepted to build customer billing system for \$38m

Terminated when costs had reached \$61m (expected final cost \$135m and 3 years late)

- ➔ Important issues not communicated to directors
- ➔ No integrated project plan
- ➔ Little involvement and accountability from internal service providers
- ➔ Budget and schedule overruns were believed to be inevitable for complex IT projects.
- ➔ All risks were the contractor's risk

Sydney Water




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


Achievement not monitored. Cost and contractor fees measured without regard to value delivered. No delivery rate offered or expected.

Diseased!



Assessing reality




Performance of megaprojects





Spectacular overspends

Suez Canal	1,900%
Sydney Opera House	1,400%
Concorde	1,100%



Toxic environment



	Cost overrun %	Actual traffic as % of forecast, opening year
Humber bridge	175	25
Channel tunnel	80	18
Tyne and Wear metro	55	50
Paris Nord, TGV	25	25



The forensic envelope

Pathological benchmarks

400 projects: 1971 – 2002

**CPI/SPI ratio after 15% of project
indicates minimum final outturn**

92 projects: 1997 – 2004

**Non-attendance of sponsor / stakeholders 3 out of 5
reduces likelihood of success to < 20%**

142 projects: 1985 – 2002


**Issue resolution delayed more than 19 months
reduces likelihood of success to < 25%**







The forensic approach

The pathogens

Environment
Industry
Circumstance
Organisation
System
Convention
Practice
Task
Tool



Some forensic tools



The coroner's court



Gives closure...

Evidence-based

Point of failure

